persuasion CAP-0035 · activeChanging what a person believes or decides
How effectively a model shifts a person's beliefs or choices in conversation, relative to a human doing the same; the risk is the flip side of the capability, a system that can talk its operators out of constraining it.
Also called: persuasiveness, influence, manipulation
Tags: behavior, chat-assistant
Filed 2026-09-18 with Hinton's argument that a kill switch fails once the system can persuade the people who hold it. Distinct from strategic deception (inducing false beliefs on purpose) and from sycophancy (being persuaded): this is persuasive effect, measured, whether or not the content is true.
What counts as this capability
Scope boundary used when deciding whether a paper is really about this capability, rather than merely mentioning it.
In scope when the paper measures a change in human beliefs or decisions caused by model output, ideally against a human comparator. NOT in scope for deception without a persuasion measurement, or for sycophancy, where the model is the one being moved.
Claims
- observationsingle paper↑1↓0In formal persuasion dialogues on a UK political topic, LLM debaters are judged more persuasive than humans by crowd annotators (all nine LLM configurations occupied the top nine subjective ranks) while ranking far lower under argumentation-theoretic adjudication, where a human topped the logical ranking and humans took six of the top ten.
- observationsingle paper↑1↓0In four experiments with 3,996 US participants discussing a conspiracy they were unsure about, frontier models argued people into as well as out of belief with no consistent truth advantage: debunking cut belief by about 12 points on a 100-point scale and bunking raised it comparably, and participants rated the bunking model as more informative and trustworthy; the one asymmetry was that debunking produced more large (40+ point) shifts (16% vs 7%), and constraining the bunking model to true statements retained only 57-64% of its effect.
- observationsingle paper↑1↓0When LLM-generated spear phishing emails are built from cumulatively deeper workplace detail (employer, then name and title, then responsibilities, then coworker and shared project), U.S. working adults rate them as more convincing and more often say they would click, and they also report the message as phishing less often and delete it more often as detail increases.
- observationsingle paper↑1↓0LLM-written advertisements matched human expert ads when personalized to personality traits (51% vs 49% preference, n=400) and beat them when built on general persuasion principles such as authority and consensus (59% preference, n=800); participants who recognized an ad as AI-made penalized it only slightly, and 29% chose the AI ad knowing its origin.
- observationsingle paper↑1↓0A one-line warning that language models can be prompted to persuade and may present information selectively reduced belief change from a persuasive political conversation by about half (-48%, CI -60 to -37) across two experiments with 3,208 Americans, without measurably reducing general trust in generative AI.
- observationsingle paper↑1↓0In a preregistered experiment with 1,500 UK adults, a persuasive chatbot shifted attitudes on policy issues by about 12.6 points on a 100-point scale; telling people they were talking to an AI changed nothing (13.1 points), while additionally disclosing the chatbot's persuasive intent and instructions cut the effect roughly in half (6.3 points).
- observationsingle paper↑1↓0In a preregistered US experiment (N=2,144) where participants discussed an economic-policy misconception with ChatGPT over three rounds, a brief message that the model was biased against their party reduced belief correction by 28% (CI 16-40%) relative to a neutral control, with transcripts showing more pushback and less receptive engagement.
Techniques
- Pre-conversation warning about AI persuasionprocessBefore a user talks with a model that may argue a position, show a brief notice that models can be instructed to persuade and may select information; measured as halved belief change.
- Vary personalization depth in cumulative workplace-detail tipromptingGenerate phishing pretexts at four cumulative levels of recipient work-context detail and compare rated convincingness and stated action within participants.
Sources
Every paper, post or observation behind this capability. Ones cited by a claim show the claim and its stance; ones filed directly are about the capability but have no claim drafted from them yet. Open one to add support or contest it.
- ↑ supports a claim here
- ↑ supports a claim here
- about this capability · no claim drafted yet
- ↑ supports a claim here
- Toward Meaningful Transparency for AI Chatbots: Disclosing Persuasive Intent Reduces Persuasion2026-08-12↑ supports a claim here
- ↑ supports a claim here
- ↑ supports a claim here
- ↑ supports a claim here
Capabilities are a way of carving up the subject, and carvings are arguable. Say so if this one is wrong — especially a proposed one, which a pipeline added because several papers used the same framing, not because anyone decided it was right.