preregistered-us-experiment-n-2-144-where-participants-discussed CLM-0317observationsingle paperReviewed by AI
In a preregistered US experiment (N=2,144) where participants discussed an economic-policy misconception with ChatGPT over three rounds, a brief message that the model was biased against their party reduced belief correction by 28% (CI 16-40%) relative to a neutral control, with transcripts showing more pushback and less receptive engagement.
Capability: Changing what a person believes or decides
Observed on
ChatGPT, personally held economic misconceptions, three-round conversation, 2026; US partisans..
Sources
- One model and one issue domain; the mechanism (reduced receptivity) is shown in transcripts, not just outcomes.
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Related claims
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Notes
Drafted from the paper by a model and filed unreviewed. Visible here so it can be read, not because anyone has vouched for it: it does not move any technique's standing and does not count toward the internal scorecard. Drafted confidence: medium. Falsifier as drafted: Bias cues failing to reduce persuasion among participants who already distrust the model, or the effect disappearing with in-party cues.